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ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREES: A PROPOSAL
TO ENLIST PRIVATE PLAINTIFFS IN
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
Because of the vast complexity and expense of adjudicating anti-
trust violations, the consent decree has become the Justice Depart-
ment's principal weapon in civil enforcement of federal antitrust laws.'
Negotiated settlement between the government and an antitrust
violator, culminating in court entry of a consent decree, has given the
government an efficient alternative to cumbersome litigation. Consent
settlement has been criticized for circumventing the scrutiny of ju-
dicial process and for insufficiently protecting the public interest by
avoiding the reinforcing deterrent effect of private treble damage suits.
Nonetheless, the longevity of the consent decree program and the
government's increasing reliance on it suggests that it is here to stay.2
There is little doubt that in terms of time and expense negotiated
settlement is relatively efficient.8 Yet the value of the program as a
substitute for adjudication of antitrust violations on the merits is
negligible if there is no assurance that the dictates of the consent de-
1 A consent decree is a court order entered to enforce a settlement between representa-
tives of the Justice Department and the defendant, without a trial of the conduct chal-
lenged, in proceedings instituted under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, or related
statutes. ANTrmUST SUBCOMMITrEE OF THE HOUSE JUDICIARy COmmITTEE, 86TH CONG., IsT
SFSS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ix (House
Jud. Comm. Pub. 1959, v. 2) [hereinafter cited as REPORT]. Although there is no express
statutory authorization for the use of consent settlements, this practice has gone largely
unchallenged for 40 years. Id. at 1. The only statutory reference to antitrust consent settle-
ment is in § 5 of the Clayton Act. See note 5 infra.
Surveys of the means of disposing of government civil antitrust suits indicate that
more than 70% of such cases terminate with the entry of a consent decree. See REPORT,
at ix; Turner, Antitrust Consent Decrees: Some Basic Policy Questions, 23 REcoRD 118
(1968).
For an outline of the procedure involved in negotiating a consent decree settlement,
see Jinkinson, Negotiation of Consent Decrees, 9 ANTrrR. BULL. 673, 687-88 (1964). For
an outline of the usual content of the consent decree, see Flynn, Consent Decrees in Anti-
trust Enforcement: Some Thoughts and Proposals, 53 IowA L. Ray. 983, 991-97 (1968).
2 As early as 1955 a comprehensive study of the Justice Department's handling of
antitrust cases revealed that: "[T]o the Government, caught in the vise of increasing
complaints and decreasing enforcement resources, [consent decree] economy may make
or break enforcement success." REPORT OF TE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMI-TEE
To STUDY THE ANTrRUST LAws 360 (1955). See also A.D. NEA. E, THE ANTrrRusT LAws OF
a UNITED STATES OF AMmucA 372 n.1 (1960).
8 See, e.g., figures regarding appropriations and time commitments of the Justice
Department from the period 1951-57 which demonstrate that the litigated suit takes,
approximately, on the average 60 months, nearly twice the time of the consent settlement.
REPORT, supra note 1, at 8-10.
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cree will be followed or enforced. Whereas the litigated antitrust de-
cree enlists the auxiliary support of interested private plaintiffs, nego-
tiated settlement precludes such assistance. By encouraging the private
parties to play a limited role in assuring antitrust defendants' compli-
ance with consent decrees, the government could more nearly achieve
its goal of eliminating anti-competitive practices.
I
THE BARGAIN NATURE OF THE CONSENT DECREE SETTLEMENT
In an effort to reduce cost and achieve efficiency, the government
foregoes formal litigation in return for defendant's consent to a legally
binding agreement, backed by the sanction of contempt, 4 obligating
defendant to refrain from or to engage in certain conduct. Since
consent decree settlements frequently require comprehensive and ex-
pensive demands of antitrust defendants, the advantages of avoiding
litigation must be substantial.
The prospect of civil litigation of alleged anti-competitive prac-
tices is ominous in diverse respects: Pending determinations may
create years of paralyzing uncertainty in business decision making;
such suits are costly in terms of distraction of executives and unusually
large legal fees; and sustained court proceedings are likely to be the
source of unfavorable publicity for the antitrust defendant. Moreover,
any determination of anti-competitive conduct in a litigated govern-
ment suit may be asserted, under section 5 of the Clayton Act, as prima
facie evidence of antitrust violations in subsequent treble damage suits
instituted by interested private parties.5
4 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 401(3)-402 (1964); Duncan, Post-Litigation Resulting from Alleged
Non-Compliance With Government Antitrust Consent Decrees, 8 CASE W. Rus. L. REv.
45, 50-54 (1956); Harsha, Some Observations on the Negotiation of Antitrust Consent
Decrees, 9 ANTrrT BuLL. 691, 695-96 (1964).
6 Section 5 of the Clayton Act reads as follows:
Judgment in favor of Government
as evidence; suspension of limitations
(a) A final judgment or decree heretofore or hereafter rendered in any civil or
criminal proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the anti-
trust laws to the effect that a defendant has violated said laws shall be prima fade
evidence against such defendant in any action or proceeding brought by any
other party against such defendant under said laws or by the United States under
section 15a of this title, as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree
would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto: Provided, That this section
shall not apply to consent judgments or decrees entered before any testimony
has been taken or to judgments or decrees entered in actions under section 15a
of this title.
38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
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By agreeing to the entry of a consent decree, defendant automat-
ically makes two concessions. If defendant's challenged conduct was
not objectionable under the antitrust laws, defendant relinquishes his
opportunity to prove this in court. And it is not unlikely that in some
circumstances a defendant concedes more in negotiation than would
be imposed by a court after litigation.6 Of course, the converse possi-
bility exists-the government may concede more in negotiating the
consent decree than litigated relief would demand.7
Although the Justice Department owes a duty to the public to
attack anti-competitive practices according to the dictates of the anti-
trust statutes, it digresses somewhat from these statutory standards
under the desirability of practical efficiency in settlement. Since con-
sent decrees are designed in part to set a standard for industry,8 com-
promise of antitrust principles through consent decrees could render
the antitrust laws useless. 9
Recognizing this fact, the Antitrust Division enters the negotia-
tions for a consent decree with a predetermined position of non-
compromise as to remedial demands.' And normally the government
need not compromise. The consent decree arises most often where
evidence for the government is sufficiently strong to withstand vigorous
litigation, not in cases where defendants think they have a chance to
prevail." Despite protestations that the government will not accept
anything less than what adjudication would yield, experience indicates
that some compromise occurs.:L- Such compromise can only be defended
in "carefully defined situations," as when: (1) The theory of the gov-
ernment is unclear on a given issue; (2) the potential gain does not
outweigh the cost and risk of litigation; or (3) the case is relatively
6 Nr.E, supra note 2, at 372.
7 Id.
8 See Assistant Attorney General Hanson's statement to the Antitrust Subcommittee
concerning the purpose of central review in Washington before a given consent settlement
is accepted by the government. He noted:
Since any judgment provision used once by the Division is often the basis of re-
quests-in court and in negotiation-for similar terms by other defendants, it is
desirable that the Division adopt similar methods to cope with similar economic
problems.
REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
9 M. GOLDBEaG, THE CONSENT DECREE, ITS FORMULATION AND USE 67 (1962); REPORT,
supra note 1, at 22. Cf. S.C. OPPENHEIM & G. WESTON, FEDERAL ANTrrRUsr LAS 845 n.29
(3d ed. 1968).
10 See Turner, supra note 1, at 121; GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 19.
11 Jinkinson, supra note 1, at 680.
12 See the analysis of the government complaint and the resulting consent decree in
the 1956 case of United States v. Western Elec. Co. and American Tel. &r TeL Co. in GOLD-
BERG, supra note 9, at 37-47.
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small and presents difficult fact questions. 3 So long as the Justice
Department substantially conforms to its policy of demanding in con-
sent decrees no less than a litigated order would require, and of
limiting exceptions to "carefully defined situations," the dictates of
the antitrust laws are not necessarily undermined.
II
THE PRICE OF EXPEDIENCY
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides for private antitrust treble
damage suits by parties injured by anti-competitive practices.' 4 In
light of the deterrent effect of threatened treble damages for conduct
violative of the antitrust laws, Congress passed section 5 to facilitate
private civil antitrust suits.' 5 Under section 5, the private plaintiff's
difficult task of proving that given conduct violates the antitrust laws
is ameliorated, and he is left only with proving damages. Because of
the evidentiary difficulties in proceeding without a section 5 determin-
ation, a substantial majority of treble damage cases follow in the wake
of successful government litigation."0
By entering the consent decree settlement with the government,
an antitrust violator is able to avoid what may otherwise be the devas-
tating consequences of government litigation-i.e., section 5 is not
applicable to suits settled by consent.17 Arguably, if the prospect of
13 Turner, supra note 1, at 119-20.
14 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) reads:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the
United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has
an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
15 The extension of the Sherman Act triple recovery provisions in the Clayton Act
suggests that compensation for private injuries is not the sole purpose of § 4. See J. ScoTr
& E. RocaEFELLx, ANTITRUST AND TRADE REGULATION. TODAY: 1967, at 261-62 (1967); E.C.
TIMBERLA.E, FEDERAL TREBLE DAmAGE ANTRUSr ACTIONS § 3.01 (1965); Jinkinson, supra
note 1, at 683; Wham, Antitrust Treble Damage Suits: The Government's Chief Aid in
Enforcement, 40 A.BA.J. 1061 (1954).
16 It has been estimated that 75 to 90% of these cases have followed successful
government suits. REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 & n.73. It has been suggested that where
litigation of antitrust cases is "extremely difficult," it is "virtually untenable" for private
parties to proceed without the assistance of a § 5 determination. GOLDBERG, Supra note 9,
at 68. See also NEALE, supra note 2, at 388-89; Note, Antitrust Enforcement By Private
Parties: Analysis of Deuelopments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61 YALE L.J. 1010, 1060
(1952).
17 The proviso to § 5 expressly excepts "consent judgments or decrees" from the
prima fade evidentiary advantage. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
An exception has been made to the proviso in a few cases by the government's
incorporation of an "asphalt clause" in the consent decree. By such a clause the defendant
[Vol. 54:763
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treble damage sanctions serves to prohibit anti-competitive practices,
because of the section. 5 prima facie rule, the prospect of settlement by
consent encourages such questionable practices. This situation has
been termed "an invitation to corporate officers to undertake programs
that may violate the law."' 8
Some commentators have taken the position that the consent
decree not only removes the teeth of the Clayton Act, but also affirma-
tively affords protection for antitrust violation. A defendant may find
a perpetual decree to his advantage both in protecting himself from
future antitrust litigation and in preventing the government from
charging that additional relief is necessary.'9 A recent analysis of one
decree characterized it as a comprehensive immunity whereby a non-
party cannot intervene to amend, expand, use as evidence, sue for
violation, or sue for activity "immunized" by it. 2 0 One writer has
pointed out in this regard that "a consent decree may be more anxiously
sought by defense counsel than dismissal of a case." 2'
But the Clayton Act itself authorizes disregard of the prima facie
advantage in deference to settlement. Section 5 expressly withholds
the prima facie advantage when the prior suit is settled by consent.
22
This alone suggests that Congress intended to place the consent set-
tlement above private actions in the hierarchy of available tools to
enforce the antitrust laws. When the treble damage provision was
proposed in Congress as an attempt to remove the economic incentive
of violation of antitrust laws, the provision met with objection. It was
agrees to let the consent decree serve as prima fade evidence in certain subsequent litiga-
tion (usually that initiated by states or other political subdivisions), thus giving the consent
decree the same effect as the litigated.decree. It has been noted that government insistence
on defendant's consent to an asphalt clause is likely to force a trial, and thus use of the
clause is limited by the government's ability to litigate. The asphalt clause is functional
only where the government's case is so strong that there is little possible gain for the
defendant in going to trial. Note, Consent Decrees and the Private Action: An Antitrust
Dilemma, 53 CAL. L. REV. 627, 638-40 (1965). In one case the government tried to compel
defendant to accept an asphalt clause in an otherwise agreed-upon settlement. United
States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962). In entering the
consent decree without the clause, the court attacked the Antitrust Division's efforts as an
"unauthorized attempt ... to avoid Congressional intent" to give the consenting defendant
the right to escape § 5. Id. at 661.
18 REPoRT, supra note 1, at 25.
19 Jinkinson, supra note 1, at 681-82, where the former chief of the midwest office
of the Antitrust Division cites dramatic examples of such protection: United States v.
International Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v. Radio Corp. of America,
46 F. Supp. 654 (D. Del. 1942).
20 Note, The ASCAP Consent Decree: The Effect on Potential Litigants, 41 S. CA..
L. REv. 418, 436 (1968).
21 Dabney, Antitrust Consent Decrees: How Protective An Umbrella?, 68 YAim L.J.
1391 (1959).
22 See text of § 5 of the Clayton Act, note 5 supra.
1969]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:763
feared that the section 5 prima facie provision would complicate
government enforcement efforts by discouraging capitulation by de-
fendants in government suits. 23 In response to this objection, the
exclusion of the prima facie doctrine from consent cases was added.24
Thus, the legislative intent of section 5 and its proviso was to encourage
settlement by consent.25
Also, the suggestion seems unfounded that defendants, as a matter
of course, may prefer the sanction of a consent decree, with its "um-
brella" protection against further government or private claims, to dis-
missal of the government complaint. Although consenting defendants
may avoid subsequent private treble damage suits, demands of consent
decrees may be burdensome enough to deter non-competitive practices.
Many go beyond a mere order to cease particular unfair practices and
demand comprehensive affirmative action by the defendant. Provisions
for divestiture, dissolution, patent licensing, restriction of future ac-
quisitions, restriction of fair trade agreements, and market limitations
are common examples of affirmative demands imposed by consent
decrees.26
The partial sacrifice of the deterrent effect of private treble dam-
age suits can be justified on grounds other than economic efficiency.
Settlement by consent affords a degree of regulatory flexibility which
is unavailable in government or private litigation. In formulating the
consent decree, the Antitrust Division can proceed with its ultimate
23 The legislative history of § 5 demonstrates this concern:
From the standpoint of the Government, the proposal to make Government
decrees conclusive in private suits is open to serious objection. . . [C]onsent
decrees have accomplished, without the consumption of the time and expense
involved in conducting prosecutions, all the relief which could be obtained by
successful litigation. No hindrance should be put in the way of the Department
of Justice in respect of these negotiations.
If this proposal were enacted, it would deter any company from ever con-
senting to the entry of a decree in a Government suit under the antitrust laws.
H.R. R .No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., part II, at 9-10 (1914). See also United States v.
Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962); Twin Ports Oil Co.
v. Pure Oil Co., 26 F. Supp. 366, 371, 374, 376 (D. Minn. 1939), aff'd, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644 (1941); Scorr & RoCKEFEr.ER, supra note 15, at 261.
24 The preliminary draft of § 5 of the Clayton Act (§ 6 of the bill) did not include
the proviso. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 2 (1914). See United States
v. Brnnswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657, 662 (E.D. Wis. 1962) (noting in regard
to the § 5 proviso, "the clear intent of Congress to encourage early entries of injunctional
decrees without long and protracted trials.'); Twin Ports Oil Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 26
F. Supp. 366, 371 (D. Minn. 1939), altd, 119 F.2d 747 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 644
(1941). See also TIMBERLAKE, supra note 15, at § 18.02; cf. McHenry, The Asphalt Clause
-A Trap for the Unwary, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1114, 1122 (1961).
25 See Wham, supra note 15, at 1061-63.
26 For illustrative consent decree settlements with such provisions, see Flynn, supra
note 1, at I001 nn.62-67 (1968).
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goal-design of a remedy which will achieve competitive conditions.
Such conditions cannot be readily accomplished by ordinary penalties
or injunctions. The flexibility of negotiated settlement enables gov-
ernment to direct its demands for relief at the causal factors of the
violation.27
Finally, an important purpose of the antitrust treble damage
actions is to allow compensation to the private parties injured by
defendant's violation.2 And nothing in current settlement procedure
precludes the private third party from bringing suit against the de-
fendant, proving his whole case, and being triply compensated in
addition to being reimbursed for attorney's fees. 29
Balancing the consent decree's shortcomings against the public
interest in flexible and economical regulation suggests that the consent
decree program should be retained.
III
POST-SETTLEMENT ENFORCEMENT OF CONSENT
DECREE PROVISIONS
The Justice Department does not attain the degree of effective
antitrust law enforcement that an examination of the sanctions in-
cluded in its many consent decrees might indicate. Like any other
court-entered decree, the consent decree is a basis for contempt pro-
27 The potential regulatory value of the consent settlement, enhanced by the flexi-
bility inherent in negotiation, was set out in W. HA3ILTON & 1. TILL, ANTrrsr IN AcrioN
88-89 (rNEC Monograph No. 16, 1940):
It can go beyond sheer prohibition; it can attempt to shape remedies to the
requirements of industrial order.. . . It can . . . comprehend all the parties to
the industry. It can accord some protection to weaker groups and safeguard to
some extent the rights of the public.... It can, unlike a decree emerging from
litigation, take into account the potential consequences of its terms. It can make
its attack on the sources, rather than the manifestations, of restraint . . . . It
can amend usage, create new trade practices, provide safeguards against un-
intended harm.
The consent decree may even regulate some legal conduct when it is suspected of being
used as part of an "illegal conspiracy to monopolize." GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 26-29.
But see NaE., supra note 2, at 412-13, noting that "some of the most remarkable and
comprehensive examples of judicial legislation are to be found among negotiated consent
decrees."
See also Flynn, supra note 1, at 1003; Note, Flexibility and Finality in Antitrust
Consent Decrees, 80 Hxv. L. REv. 1803, 1305 (1967); Note, supra note 20, at 430.
28 The House Report on the Clayton Act stated that the present § 5 "is intended
to help persons of small means who are injured in their property or business [by violations
of] the antitrust laws." H.R. RE,. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, at 14 (1914). See
51 CONG. REc. 9270, 9490, 13851 (1914). See also TimBu.AE, supra note 15, at § 3.01.
29 See the text of § 4 of the Clayton Act, note 14 supra.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ceedings.80 Yet, where the court-entered decree is merely the result of
a tacit bargain between the government and defendant, contemptuous
conduct will often go unnoticed unless the Justice Department makes
a specific effort to prevent it.31 If limited resources preclude litigation
of the majority of antitrust suits, that same lack of funds may prohibit
pursuing settlement cases beyond the entry of the consent decree.42
Almost thirty years ago, a comprehensive evaluation of government
enforcement of the antitrust laws found that "the great weakness [of
the consent decree program] is that the [Antitrust] Division lacks the
facilities for the follow-up essential to keep the decree alive."1' Since
that time the Justice Department has devised no procedures by which
conduct transgressing the terms of the consent decree is brought to
its attention "as a matter of routine."8 4
It has been suggested that only when the consent decree requires
immediate action, such as sale of property, divestment of shares of
stock, or dissolution of a trade association, is the authorities' attention
held during the remedial process.3 5 The Justice Department has relied
on two types of provisions within the decree to attain compliance;
neither has been effective. Some decrees have included specific pro-
visions for continuing supervision in the courts. Such provisions have
been termed "essentially regulatory" and outside the normal, proper
business of the Division, since they may create detailed supervisory
obligations.86 Other decree provisions contemplate direct supervision
by the Justice Department. The decree may grant inspection rights to
the Justice Department or may require the defendant to submit
periodic progress reports to the Justice Department as evidence of
conformity. A congressional investigation of the consent decree pro-
gram revealed that such progress reports had been infrequently used,
and, although inspection was more frequently imposed, it was rarely
followed up for practical reasons8 7 Thus any guarantee of detection
of non-conformity with consent decree demands is absent. The Di-
vision's resources have permitted little more than investigation of
complaints by interested outside parties.5 8
so 62 Stat. 701 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 401(3) (1964).
81 See GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 66; HAMILTON & TmLr, supra note 27, at 92-93;
Flynn, supra note 1, at 997.
82 See NEALE, supra note 2, at 374-75; Duncan, supra note 4, at 55.
85 HAMILTON & TILL, supra note 27, at 95 n21.
84 RE'ORT, supra note 1, at 16.
35 RAWILTON & TILL, supra note 27, at 92-93.
56 An Interview with the Honorable Donald F. Turner, 50 ABA ANTrrRusr SECTON
100, 108-09 (1966).
87 REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; see Flynn, supra note 1, at 995-97.
38 REPORT, supra note 1, at 16; Duncan, supra note 4, at 55.
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A. Post-Decree Enforcement
Since both consent and litigated decrees are entered by the court
and are subject to contempt sanctions, a similar degree of enforcement
assurance might be expected. But because of the reduced threat of
subsequent private litigation and the element of secrecy that surrounds
the whole consent settlement procedure, this is not the case.
A litigated determination of anti-competitive conduct inherently
represents to the defendant a threat of future litigation by private
plaintiffs under sections 4 and 5 of the Clayton Act.
Under section 5, presumably the private plaintiff would have a
prima facie case only regarding the defendant's anti-competitive con-
duct prior to the entry of the litigated decree.8 9 But, if the private
plaintiff alleges that he has been damaged further by defendant's
post-entry anti-competitive practices, noncompliance with the terms of
the litigated decree could be fatal to defendant's case. Although the
private plaintiff will not have a prima facie advantage, the Justice
Department's initial case is readily accessible to the plaintiff. The
defendant who has not complied with the prior litigated decree may
be hard pressed to show that it is inapplicable to subsequent violations
of antitrust regulations.40 Although it would be difficult to estimate
the subjective impact of lack of compliances on a court and jury, the
mere possibility of its drastic consequences should encourage con-
formity with provisions of litigated decrees.
This element of pressure on the defendant is present to a substan-
tially lesser degree where the defendant has submitted to a consent
decree. The threat of further judicial exposure is mitigated by the
consent decree's preemption of private plaintiffs' prima facie advantage;
the strategy and data of the government's prior attack are unavailable to a
private plaintiff who would pursue treble damages for post-decree
anti-competitive practices. 41 Consent settlement negotiations are car-
89 See International Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 315 F.2d 449
(Ist Cir. 1963).
40 Cf. Sablosky v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929, 935-36 (E.D. Pa.
1955). Under the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1311-14 (1964), the potential
antitrust defendant must surrender to the Antitrust Division "any documentary
material relevant to a dvil antitrust investigation." Id. § 1312(a). The documents
will be returned at the conclusion of a case brought by the United States without
having been made available to anyone but the government, except those which have passed
into the control of any court or grand jury through the introduction thereof into the
record of such case or proceeding. Id. § 1313(e).
41 It has been suggested that the challenged antitrust defendant who wishes to obtain
the § 5 proviso advantages from settling by consent should agree to negotiations before
the government commences its pre-trial discovery. Answers to interrogations, depositions,
and other pre-trial steps may lead to government exposure to the public of damaging
evidence; the § 5 proviso may be less meaningful where the government has made out a
1969]
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ried on in private, no formal records are kept, and information is
disclosed to the government only on the condition that it will not be
made public. 42 In defense of these procedures, the government po-
sition must be that consent decree negotiations are distinct from the
adjudication process, and are therefore not subject to the standards
which -control adjudicative procedure.43 But a direct result of the
secrecy surrounding consent decrees is the reduced possibility of a
court's having contemptuous conduct brought to its attention by
private plaintiffs.
Another objection to the secrecy of the consent decree program is
that interested outsiders have no way of knowing if their interests are
being adequately protected by the Justice Department.44 The govern-
ment has taken the position that the Antitrust Division can most
effectively represent the public interest.45 Although it is unlikely that
the secrecy surrounding actual consent decree negotiation will be pene-
trated,46 the Department and the courts have recently shown some
sensitivity to the concerns of interested third parties. Prior to a change
in administrative regulations, the first time any outsider had access to
settlement terms was after a decree's entry by the court as a final
judgment. Under current procedures, however, the proposed settle-
ment is filed for thirty days, during which time it is subject to objection
and modification where outside parties can show this would be ap-
case for any interested private litigant even though it may not be asserted as prima fade
evidence. See Publicity in Taking Evidence Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80 (1964); Olympic Refining
Co. v. Carter, 332 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964) (protective court orders dissolved in deference
to policies favoring disclosure of pre-trial discovery matters); Harsha, supra note 4, at
697-98.
42 The Justice Department's commitment to protecting the strict secrecy surrounding
consent settlement negotiations prevented it from cooperating with the House Antitrust
Subcommittee in its study of the consent decree program. REPORT, supra note 1, at xi.
43 Cf. William H. Rorer, Inc. v. FTC, BNA ANTiR. & TR. REG. REP. No. 151, A-7
(D.D.C. 1964).
44 GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 68; Flynn, supra note 1, at 1009.
45 See United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003, 1008 (2d Cir. 1965). It has been sug-
gested that it may not be in the public interest to recognize the recommendations of
individual private parties, however justifiably aggrieved they may be, because such 'recom-
mendations can frequently not be disassociated from the self-interest of the parties making
them, and the clamor created by their intrusion may be unconducive to successful negotia-
tion. Timberg, Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judgments, 10 FED. B.J. 351,
354-55 (1949).
46 Should the veil of secrecy surrounding consent settlement be pierced, it is likely
that the government would be forced to trial in many more antitrust suits. The consenting
defendant is protected to a large degree by the Antitrust Civil Process Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1311-14 (1964), which provides for withholding from public scrutiny relevant docu-
mentary material unless it has passed into the control of the court as evidence in the
record. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1313(c), (d) (1964). The Publicity in Taking Evidence Act refers only
to hearings before a master or examiner or to depositions. 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1964).
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propriate.47 A 1964 Ninth Circuit case, Olympic Refining Co. v.
Carter,48 held that protective court orders guaranteeing non-disclosure
of certain government-discovered documents could not stand in the
face of policies supporting disclosure. A case currently pending in the
federal courts will decide the applicability of Olympic to protective
orders concerning consent decree progress reports.49
B. A Proposal For Consent Decree Enforcement
By integrating several provisions already familiar to antitrust law
enforcement, the Antitrust Division could insure compliance with
consent decrees without substantially increasing commitments of Jus-
tice Department resources.
Because of the secrecy that surrounds the consent decree negotia-
tion, the only information regarding the settlement available to in-
terested parties is the government's initial complaint and the actual
decree. The interested outsider, with nothing more before him, will
probably not fully understand the meaning of the decree. 0 Several
critics of the consent decree program have proposed that the Depart-
ment submit an opinion to the court, along with the proposed consent
decree, explaining the facts involved in the case, the meaning of the
terms of the decree, and the basis of the government's acceptance of
the settlement.51 These proposals are sound. An opinion from the
Antitrust Division will eliminate the current absence of any specific
connection between the allegations of the complaint and the relief
demanded in the consent decree. Also, interested outsiders will receive
the assurance that the Justice Department is not settling for less than
it could get by litigation.
The Antitrust Division has occasionally required progress reports
on conformity to consent settlement demands.52 Were this required in
47 28 C.F.R. § 50.1(b) (1968). See, e.g., United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F.
Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967); United States v. Schaefer, 5 TRADE REG. REp. (1968 Trade
Cas. 84,989) 72,345 (E.D.N.Y. 1967).
48 832 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1964).
49 Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Lynne, BNA ANTTR. & TR. REP. No. 875, A-1 (E.D.
La. Aug. 14, 1968).
50 HAmrLTON & TiLL, supra note 27, at 90.
51 E.g., GOLDBERG, supra note 9, at 69-70; ATroRNEY GENERL's REPORT, supra note 2,
at 860. But see Note, 80 HARv. L. RE.v, supra note 27, at 1815, where as to a statement of
purposes and objectives within the decree it is objected that, "it appears unlikely that
the parties would be able to agree on this point." In response to this it is suggested that
the Justice Department unilaterally submit a statement explaining basic facts and objec-
tives of the decree.
52 See, e.g., summary of provisions in a representative decree in GOLDBERG, supra note
9, at 31-83; Standard Fruit & S.S. Co. v. Lynne, BNA ArNma. & TR. REG. REP. No. 875, A-1
(E.D. La. Aug. 14, 1968).
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every consent decree, the Justice Department and interested outsiders
would have some assurance that the consenting defendant would not
consider his obligations fulfilled with the entry of the decree.
Finally, the price the Justice Department ultimately pays for the
economy of settlement by consent is the abandonment of its auxiliary
enforcement agent, the private treble damage plaintiff. The private
antitrust plaintiff is properly denied a prima facie case of violation
prior to entry of the consent decree because this encourages antitrust
defendants to enter settlement negotiations with the government. But
the same considerations are not present to militate against employing
the private plaintiff to insure compliance with consent decree pro-
visions. Although it is financially unfeasible for the government to
police the hundreds of consent decrees currently in force, interested
private parties could be economically and effectively used in the en-
forcement effort.53 The obvious incentive to such enforcement would
be the application of a variation of the Clayton Act prima facie doctrine
to the defendant who violates the provisions of a consent decree; private
plaintiffs could recover treble damages upon proof of losses resulting
from defendant's transgressing the consent decree's prohibitions.
5 4
It has usually been held that allegations of injury resulting from
53 See Flynn, supra note 1, at 1015-18. The commentator's evaluation of the consent
decree program stresses that the government's failure to enforce decrees, the questionable
utility of contempt proceedings for violation of consent decrees, and the invitation to
circumvent the standard set by the consent decree suggest that a consent decree should
be used as a regulatory decree. Flynn maintains that, if consent decrees are to be regu-
latory, a regulatory, rather than a litigation-oriented, branch of the government should
administer them. He goes on to suggest that if consent decrees retain their prohibitive (as
opposed to regulatory) function, "that private litigants be given a right of action to enforce
the decree ... in light of the Government's failure [to do so]." Id. at 1016.
A recent commentator proposed that private plaintiffs be permitted to assert a judg-
ment of a consent decree defendant's contempt of the decree as prima facie evidence in a
subsequent private treble damage suit. Note, supra note 17, at 644-46. This would promote
compliance with consent decrees, but could be effective only to the extent that the courts
first efficiently policed consent decree compliance with their contempt powers.
54 In every case, the private treble damage plaintiff must demonstrate direct injury to
his business or property by reason of the defendant's unlawful act, aside from injury to
the general public. It is for the government to protect the public at large, not private
treble damage plaintiffs. See, e.g., Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 169 F. Supp. 677, 690-91 (E.D.
Pa. 1958); Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark. 1951). This merely
gives force to the expressed wording of § 4 of the Clayton Act: "Any person who shall be
injured in his business or property .... 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 US.C. § 15 (1964).
The proposal to extend an evidentiary advantage to the treble damage plaintiff con-
cerns only damages suffered subsequent to the entry of the consent decree. This of course
is necessary to preserve for the defendant the appeal of consent settlement as contemplated
by the proviso of § 5 of the Clayton Act.
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defendant's violation of prior consent decrees are inappropriate,5
and that the section 5 prima facie privilege is limited to violations
"under [the antitrust] laws."56 In effect, the courts' objection has been
that giving the private plaintiff a prima facie case after defendant
violates the consent decree approaches giving the provisions of the
consent decree the force of statutory law. But this is inaccurate. Viola-
tion of a consent decree would not of itself assure recovery,57 but rather
it would create an evidentiary 8 disadvantage to the violator, rendering
him particularly vulnerable to suit. Proof of such a violation and re-
sultant damages would establish a presumption that defendant violated
the antitrust laws.59 Defendant could conceivably demonstrate that
the conduct which violated the consent decree was not a violation of
the antitrust laws. The proposed scheme would not prohibit this, but
55 E.g., Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502 (N.D. Ohio 1961);
Independent Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 179
F. Supp. 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 312 (W.D. Ark.
1951); cf. Kearuth Theatres Corp. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. 72,309
(S.D.N.Y. 1956); Tivoli Realty v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 800 (D. Del. 1948).
See also TIMBMIA.E, supra note 15, at §§ 2.04, 18.17.
56 E.g., Paul H. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502, 504 (N.D. Ohio 1961)
(in granting a motion to dismiss certain allegations in a complaint the court said, "The
definition of 'antitrust laws' in 15 U.S.C.A. § 12 [§ 1 of Clayton Act], clearly embraces
only the statutes described therein.'); Independent Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcast-
ing-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 179 F. Supp. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (in striking references
to a prior consent decree from plaintiff's complaint, the court held, "Plaintiff's claim must
rest upon alleged violation of the antitrust statutes and not upon any claimed violation
of the decree.'); Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 312, 317 (W.D. Ark. 1951)
(in striking reference in the complaint to non-compliance with a prior decree the court
noted, "[iMt appears to the court that it is not proper to plead the decree, because the basis
of plaintiff's claim is not the decree but the violation on the part of the defendant of
the anti-trust laws.").
57 Violation of the consent decree, in and of itself, subjects the antitrust defendant to
contempt prosecution, 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1964), but the private plaintiff has no standing
to enforce a court decree. United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003, 1007 (2d Cir. 1965);
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
58 Cf. Kearuth Theatres Corp. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. 72,309
(SID.N.Y. 1956), where the court points out that the Clayton Act § 5 prima fade doctrine
is a "rule of evidence."
59 The legislative history and the case law establish that the prima fade doctrine
of § 5 creates a presumption of defendant's violation of the antitrust laws rather than
conclusive evidence. Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp., 271 F.2d 709, 723-27 (9th Cir.
1959); United States v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 203 F. Supp. 657, 660 n.1 (E.D. Wis.
1962). Although the House version of the bill provided for a conclusive case, the
Senate proposal for a prima fade advantage was adopted. S. REP'. No. 698, 63d Cong.,
2d Sess. 45 (1914). The private plaintiff's prima fade presumption does not serve to relieve
him of his burden of proof. Sablosky v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 137 F. Supp. 929,
936 (E.D. Pa. 1955).
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it would give defendant the burden of coming forward to rebut plain-
tiff's prima facie case.60 And this is proper since the private plaintiff has
no access to the information that led to the government-defendant
settlement. 61
Furthermore, the objection that this procedure amounts to giving
statutory force to non-statutory matter is too simplistic. Consent decree
provisions currently have statutory qualities; the regulations set forth
in the settlement are the antitrust "law" as to individual consenting
defendants. And defendant's violation of the consent decree subjects
him to liability for contempt, even in the absence of direct evidence
that antitrust statutes have been violated.62 If the Antitrust Division
can create sanctions for individual antitrust defendants through con-
sent decrees, it seems equally justifiable to permit private plaintiffs,
who have suffered resultant pecuniary loss, to enforce these government-
created sanctions. 63 The history of the consent decree program has
demonstrated that, without such assistance, the Justice Department is
unable to effectively enforce the regulations it creates. 4
The body of case law holding allegations of violations of consent
0 The proposal assumes, in placing the burden on the defendant of proving that
non-conformity with the consent decree is not a violation of antitrust laws, that the
mandates of the consent decree will accurately reflect the mandates of the antitrust laws.
Most consent decrees are perpetual in duration. Conceivably, consent decree demands that
were consistent with the antitrust laws at a point in time of the entry of a consent decree,
after the passage of time and with a change in competitive conditions, may no longer
reflect such consistency. Thus the proposal that consent decree violation should evidence
violation of the antitrust laws increases the need for a procedure whereby the terms of the
consent decree can be modified if the passage of time renders provisions inappropriate.
Recent comment on the consent decree program suggests that such a procedure is lacking.
See generally Note, 80 HARv. L. Rnv., supra note 27, at 1303. See also OPPENHEIm. & WEs-
TON, supra note 9, at 843-54; REPORT, supra note 1, at 3-6; Dabney, supra note 21, at 1392-
97; Duncan, supra note 4, at 48; Harsha, supra note 4, at 693-95; Turner, supra note 1, at
126-28.
61 See pp. 771-73 & notes 41 & 42 supra.
62 See Note, supra note 20, at 430.
It has been noted that consent decrees frequently enjoin acts which are "lawful in
themselves." (emphasis added). Paul M. Harrod Co. v. A.B. Dick Co., 194 F. Supp. 502,
504 (N.D. Ohio 1961). Yet the fact that these acts are the subject of consent decree regula-
tions may suggest that, in the estimation of the Justice Department, they are unlawful
in the context of defendant's total business practices. See GO.DBERM, supra note 9, at 26-29.
63 Vesting a private right of action in interested outsiders who have suffered direct
injury from defendant's violation of government regulations is not foreign to other areas
of the law. Cf. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, modified by additional
conclusions of fact and law, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa. 1947), where, in connection with
alleged violation of securities regulations, the court held that, "although not expressly
provided for in the statute, a remedy by civil action to enforce such duties and liabilities
was available to the plaintiffs." Id. at 800.
64 See pp. 769-71 supra; Flynn, supra note 1, at 999.
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decree provisions not to be violations under the antitrust laws 5 sug-
gests that the initiation of the above proposal would necessitate legis-
lative action.60 This should take the form of an amendment of the
proviso to section 5 of the Clayton Act:67
Provided: This section shall not apply to consent judgments or
decrees entered before any testimony has been taken: Except, that
violation of the consent judgment or decree shall be prima facie
evidence of violation of said antitrust laws in suits by any other
party against such defendant for injuries suffered subsequent to
the entry of the consent judgment or decree.
However, one case suggests a means by which a prima facie ad-
vantage could be given private treble damage plaintiffs under the
current statutes. In Simco Sales Service v. Air Reduction Co.,68 a private
treble damage plaintiff alleged that defendant had violated a prior
government consent decree and had subsequently been found in con-
tempt. Defendant moved to strike these allegations. The court, inter-
preting section 5, denied defendant's motion. It maintained that an
established violation of a consent decree by a contempt judgment comes
within section 5 proceedings "under the antitrust laws":
[Mhere contempt proceedings are instituted to compel compliance,
or punish failure to comply, with the terms of a Court decree
entered to enforce the provisions of [the antitrust laws], the con-
tempt proceedings are ancillary to and, therefore, a "proceeding
under" the laws for the enforcement of which the decree was
entered.69
Contempt proceedings need not make out actual violations of the
antitrust laws.70 Thus, since contempt proceedings can be viewed as
"ancillary to, and, therefore, proceeding under" the antitrust laws, the
direct private action for consent decree violation could come "under
the laws for the enforcement of which the decree was entered."
The proposed enlistment of the private plaintiff in effective anti-
trust law enforcement will bolster the Justice Department's consent
decree program where it is currently most deficient: in insuring corn-
65 See note 55 supra.
66 See Note, supra note 17, at 647.
67 Complete text of § 5 of Clayton Act appears at note 5 supra.
68 213 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
69 Id. at 507. As to any interference with the Clayton Act § 5 consent proviso by this
holding, the court noted:
To extend the scope of the proviso to proceedings instituted to punish violations
of such consent decrees would be to encourage the very conduct which the
legislation was designed to eliminate.
70 See note 62 supra.
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pliance with consent decree demands once a decree becomes effective.
Defendants will not be discouraged from negotiating settlements
with the Antitrust Division and there will be no interference with
either defendant's protective shield of secrecy in negotiating or the
protection from the prima facie violation doctrine in regard to treble
damages prior to entry of the decree. The government's bargaining
leverage will remain intact. And perhaps most significant, enlistment
of the private plaintiff will not tax the resources of the Justice Depart-
ment.
A. Bruce Campbell
